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There is large evidence on a positive impact of information and communication technologies
(ICT) on economic growth and productivity in a number of developed countries in the 1990’s.
There are however no studies, which would estimate the contribution of ICT to growth and
productivity in post-communist, transition economies. Data availability, consistency, and
trustworthiness have been so far the main obstacles.
This paper makes a first attempt, based on an extended growth accounting framework, at
estimating the contribution of investment in ICT to output growth and labor productivity in
Poland, the largest post-communist economy in Central and Eastern Europe and a prospective
member of the EU (2004). The paper discusses the challenges of using available data and its
impact on the choice of specific methodologies.
The paper shows that ICT investment contributed on average 0.47 of a percentage point or 8.9%
of GDP growth and 12.7% or 0.65 of a percentage point contribution to labor productivity
between 1995-2000. This relatively large impact of ICT capital is due to an extraordinary
acceleration in ICT investments between 1993-2001 induced by – one the one hand – rapidly
falling prices of ICT products and services and – on the other hand – large demand for ICT
fueled by high economic growth in the 1990’s and substantial pent-up demand due to
infrastructural underinvestment in ICT.
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In spite of the recent worldwide economic gloom, the rapid pace of technological progress has
not been arrested. The technological revolution in particularly information and communication
technologies (ICT), which has contributed to the extraordinary performance of the US economy
in the late 1990’s (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2001, Oliner and Sichel 2000, Stiroh 2002), has not
slowed down. The computing power of microchips, which underlies the rapid progress in
productivity of ICT, has kept on doubling every 18-24 months, as Moore’s Law has rightly
predicted since 1965. The pace of progress in capacity of microchips has accelerated after 1995
as the product cycle for semiconductors - due to increased market competition - shortened from
three to two years, which led to a decline in prices of semiconductors of some 90 percent per
year (Jorgenson 2001). The rapidly falling prices of ICT products and services along with their
increasing efficiency and quality kept on enticing businesses to spend on ICT, although the pace
of investment has markedly slowed down after March 2001.
The erstwhile notion of a ‘new economy’ understood as a superior economic structure displaying
sustainable and extraordinary increase in growth and productivity growth fueled by the ICT and
coupled with low inflation and unemployment has been discarded. It was replaced with a notion
of a ‘new economy’ understood as a host of new economic phenomena resulting from the two
concurrent processes: on the one hand globalization, that is on-going deregulation, integration of
the global markets for capital, goods, labor, and increased competition, and on the other hand,
technological revolution based mostly on general-purpose ICT, which -- while impacting all
sectors of the economy -- accelerate productivity and economic growth2.
This paper will utilize a more narrow definition, where the ‘new economy’ is defined as an
economy characterized by high growth rates in output and productivity fueled by production and
use of ICT products and services.
Aside from the USA, the use and/or production of ICT have contributed to an increase in the rate
of productivity and economic growth in a number of developed and developing countries in the
late 1990’s. Among the former, Australia, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland seem to have tapped the
‘new economy’ to the largest extent (OECD 2001a, Jalava and Pohjola 2002, Daveri 2002).
Among the developing countries, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan
benefited from the production of ICT (IMF 2001).
Yet, there is no evidence that other countries, both developed and developing, were able to take
advantage of ICT in order to accelerate their rates of growth and productivity. The lack of
macroeconomic impact of the use of ICT on developing countries was confirmed by the results
of a comprehensive cross-country empirical study on the returns of IT investment in developed
and developing countries (Dewan and Kraemer 2000). The study showed that returns on IT
investment are ‘positive and significant for developed countries, but not statistically significant
for developing countries’ (as quoted in Kraemer and Dedrick 2001, p. 262). The estimate of IT
output elasticity is 0.057 (positive and significant) for developed countries, but statistically
indistinguishable from 0 for developing countries. Pohjola (2000) shows that the relative
contribution of IT to GDP growth in developing countries between 1980 and 1995 was less than
2 per cent (China, India, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Thailand, Venezuela) compared to more than
10 per cent in the US, Finland, Canada, Sweden, and UK. No other studies have found any
sizeable contribution of ICT to growth in developing countries. There are no studies that would
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estimate the impact of the ICT revolution on output growth and productivity in post-communist,
transition economies i.e. transforming from a command economy to a market economy.
Hence, this paper makes a first attempt at estimating the contribution of ICT investment to
growth and labor productivity in Poland, the largest post-communist economy in Central and
Eastern Europe and soon a member of the EU. The study covers the period of 1995-2000. The
paper utilizes the extended growth accounting methodology. Data for ICT spending between
1992 and 2001 is obtained from WITSA (2000, 2002), which in turn is provided by International
Data Corporation (IDC). All the other data is from the Poland’s Central Statistical Office (2002).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology of accounting for
the overall economic impact of ICT based on the extended growth accounting methodology.
Section 3 applies the methodology to measure the contribution of ICT investment to output and
labor productivity growth in Poland. It also discusses challenges posed by the availability of
data. Section 4 presents results of the study and compares them with those obtained for
developed countries. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Accounting for the economic impact of ICT
The methodology of measuring the contribution of ICT to growth and productivity is based on
original work by Solow (1957) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1968) and later extended by inter
alia Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). Since ICT products and services
are both outputs from the ICT industries and inputs into ICT-using industries, ICT can impact
economic growth through four major channels (Jalava, Pohjola 2002):
(i)  production of ICT goods and services, which directly contributes to the aggregate value
added generated in an economy;
(ii)  increase in productivity of production in ICT sector, which contributes to overall
productivity in an economy (TFP);
(iii)  use of ICT capital as in input in the production of other goods and services;
(iv)  contribution to economy-wide TFP from increase in productivity in non-ICT producing
sectors induced by the production and use of ICT (spillover effects);
To measure the overall impact of ICT on growth, it is best to express the aggregate production
function in the following form:
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where, at any given time t, aggregate value added Y is assumed to consist of ICT goods and
services ICT – Y
ICT
t,  as well as of other production Y
0
t.  These outputs are produced from
aggregate inputs consisting of ICT capital Ct,, other (i.e. non-ICT) physical capital Kt,, and labor
Lt. TFP (total factor productivity) is here represented in the Hicks neutral or output augmenting
form by parameter A.
Assuming that constant returns to scale prevail in production and that all production factors are
paid their marginal products, equation (1) can be expressed in the following form:
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∧ indicates the rate of change and the time index t has been suppressed for the
simplicity of exposition. The weights wICT and w0 denote the nominal output shares of ICT and5
non-ICT production, respectively. The weights sum to one similarly as the weights vICT, v0, and
vL, which represent the nominal shares of ICT capital, non-ICT capital, and labor, respectively3.
Denoting the total employment by H(t) and labour productivity by Y(t)/H(t), the equation (2) can
then be re-arranged to measure the contribution of ICT investment to growth in labour
productivity
A H K v H C v H Y t ICT ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
0 0 + − + − = −
∧
(3)
As shown in the above equation, there are three sources of growth in labor productivity: ICT
capital deepening, i.e. increase in ICT capital services per employed person, non-ICT capital
deepening, and total factor productivity.4
Due to limited scope of the paper, the paper will focus on only one channel through which ICT
impacts growth that is through the contribution of ICT capital to output growth.5
3. Accounting for contribution of ICT investment to output growth
As on the right hand-side of the equation (2) the contribution of ICT investment to output growth
can be defined as a sum of contributions from ICT capital ( t C
∧
), non-ICT capital ( 0 ˆ K ) and labor
(L ˆ ), where weights vICT, v0, and vL represent the nominal shares of ICT capital, non-ICT capital,
and labor, respectively, and sum to one. Total factor productivity (TFP) is represented in the
Hicks neutral or output-augmenting form by parameter A. Symbol 
∧ indicates the rate of change.
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So far the efforts to calculate the impact of ICT investment on growth in transition economies
have failed due to the lack of data on:
(i)  ICT investment and capital stock,
(ii)  ICT income shares in total income.
                                                
3 Please note that this study does not correct TFP for changes in labor quality. Hence, given anecdotal evidence
pointing to the increase in quality of human capital, the results produced in this study are likely to overestimate
the true increase in TFP in Poland.
4 Again, due to lack of data, the study does not take into account the improvement in labor quality. For the same
reason, the study does not measure the ICT contribution to labor productivity through productivity growth in the
ICT-producing sector, which impacts TFP. Moreover, any estimates of spillover effects of ICT production and
use, which could impact TFP, will not be discussed here.
5 Due to poor availability of data it is quite challenging to estimate the impact of ICT on growth in Poland and other
post-communist countries through the remaining three channels - direct contribution of ICT production to GDP
(i), an increase in productivity of production in ICT (ii) and spillover effects of the ICT use (iv). At this point it
is only possible to make a rough estimate of the contribution of ICT production to output growth in three
countries - Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic – for which the data on ICT-producing sector share in
total business sector value added is available from the OECD (2002) for the period of 1995-2000. According to
rough estimates of the author based on the above and estimated growth rates of value added in ICT production,
its contribution to output growth between 1995-2000 for Hungary (1995-1999), Czech Republic and Slovakia
amounted to 1.0, 0.73 and 0.29 percentage points, respectively. For Poland it is estimated that ICT sector
produces roughly 1-2% of total GDP. Based on a comparison of the size of the ICT sector in Poland and the
other three countries mentioned above, the contribution of ICT production in Poland is likely not to exceed 0.1
of a percentage point of growth. Thus, ICT use rather than production will be the main driver of ICT impact on
output growth in Poland.6
Yet these shortcomings in data can be overcome. The following two subsections present the
specific data problems together with methodologies and assumptions, which were used to arrive
at final estimates of ICT capital contribution to growth and labor productivity in Poland between
1995 and 2000.
Accounting for ICT stock
Poland’s Central Statistical Office (GUS), as most statistical offices in postsocialist countries,
does not provide information about investment in ICT assets6. It does not provide hedonic (i.e.
constant-quality) price indices for ICT stock and depreciation rates on ICT assets, either.
Nonetheless, the lack of data from national statistics on ICT can be mitigated by a use of
alternative sources of data and a utilization of a number of assumptions.
ICT investment
The data on ICT spending can be obtained from a private source - WITSA Digital Planet report
(2002), which relies on data provided by International Data Corporation (IDC)7. WITSA
provides consistent information on total spending on hardware, software and communication
equipment between 1992 and 2001 in 51 countries representing 98% of the total global spending.
The series include data on eight transition economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
ICT spending as a share of GDP in Poland and seven other transition countries based on WITSA
(2002) between 1993-2001 is displayed in Table 1.
Table 1. ICT spending in eight transition countries 1993-2001, as % of GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria 2.23 2.88 2.32 2.71 2.97 3.11 3.60 4.12 4.17
Czech Republic 5.56 5.34 5.95 5.80 6.44 6.56 7.85 9.10 8.73
Hungary 4.17 4.32 3.88 4.28 4.46 7.50 8.23 8.93 10.02
Poland 2.06 2.08 2.16 2.28 2.57 4.59 5.43 6.06 5.95
Romania 1.07 1.09 0.93 1.03 1.28 1.39 2.09 2.32 2.41
Russia 4.01 3.18 1.83 1.71 1.97 2.66 4.11 3.52 3.20
Slovakia 4.23 4.18 4.04 4.02 3.89 5.55 6.78 8.12 8.78
Slovenia 3.02 3.03 2.92 3.08 3.39 3.72 4.42 5.26 4.72
Average 4.45 4.45 4.46 4.69 4.98 5.64 6.22 6.81 7.27
Source: WITSA (2002)
The ICT spending in Poland as a ratio of GDP has been steadily increasing since 1993 from
2.06% to 5.95% in 2001. Despite the increase, the ICT spending in Czech Republic, Hungary
                                                
6 It is projected that GUS will produce first estimates of the ICT investment in Poland in the end of 2004. Slovenia
is the only postsocialist country so far, which has published actual data for IT investment between 1996 and 2001,
and total ICT investment for 2001 (Stare et al. 2003).
7 ICT spending by WITSA (2002) includes computer hardware, software, internal services, other office products,
and telecommunications equipment and services. No data is provided on embedded ICT in non-ICT products and on
ICT expenditure of non-incorporated entreprises. Moreover, WITSA (2002) data definitions of ICT do not exactly
conform to those of either OECD or national accounting. WITSA data is also subject to a few measurement biases,
yet their combined effects are hard to measure (for more detailed discussion of other WITSA data caveats see
Daveri 2002).7
and Slovakia in relative terms in 2001 was higher than in Poland. In the whole WITSA sample of
51 countries, which is biased towards developed countries, Poland’s average spending on ICT in
the period was almost two percentage points lower than the overall average. Nonetheless, the gap
has been on a decrease throughout the period: in 2001 the difference in spending narrowed to 1.3
of a percentage point.
In nominal terms, Poland experienced a phenomenal six-fold increase in annual ICT spending
from USD 1,772 million in 1993 to USD 10,489 million in 2001. This result puts Poland in the
forefront of ICT spending among the transition economies (Figure 1).
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* Other EE – other Eastern European countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro.
Source: WITSA (2002)
Trends in ICT spending in Poland should also be displayed against the background of the EU,
OECD, and developing countries (Figure 2).8







1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Average 24 developing** Average EU*
Poland Average OECD24
* Excludes Luxembourg; ** Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam. Note: non-weighted arithmetic averages.
Source: WITSA (2002)
Between 1993 and 2001 Poland’s relative position in ICT spending has been improving
compared to all groups of countries. In 2001 the share of ICT spending in GDP caught up with
the average ICT spending in the group of 24 middle and lower income developing countries. The
possible explanation for this fast catch-up is the substantial pent-up demand for ICT products and
services resulting from substantial underinvestment in ICT infrastructure before 19898. This,
together with high rates of economic growth in the 1990’s, created opportunities for higher-than-
normal returns on ICT investment, which induced firms to spend on ICT.
Dataset from WITSA (2002) on ICT spending does not delineate the expenditure shares of
enterprises, government and households. Neither does it divide the spending between investment
and services. Since spending by households and spending on services should not be regarded as
ICT investment, their share in total spending has to be estimated and deducted from the total.
Schreyer (2000) and Jalava and Pohjola (2002) estimate, based on a comparison between an
actual investment data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and WITSA data on
the ICT spending in the US, that the share of telecommunication investment in total spending
reported by WITSA equals 30%. Contrary to this approach, although based on the same BEA -
WITSA comparison, Daveri (2002) breaks up the whole IDC data into investment shares and
household expenditure, applying 59% share of investment in hardware expenditure, 33% for
telecommunications spending and 205% for software (Daveri’s investment shares are for
business sector only – he excludes government spending).
                                                
8  For example, Poland’s fixed line telephone penetration increased from 12 lines per 100 inhabitants in 1990 to
roughly 30 in 2002. Likewise, mobile phone penetration increased from zero in 1990 to approx. 33 as of the end
of 2002.9
For Poland it was assumed that the share of telecommunication investment in total
telecommunication spending amounted to 30% in the 1992-2001 period. The share of investment
in IT hardware in total IT hardware spending in the 1992-2001 period, based on actual data from
IDC for Poland for 2001 (IDC 2002), was set to amount to 93.0% Under an assumption - based
on estimates of the local IDC office - that the data on software spending does not take into
account internally developed, custom made software, what BEA calls ‘own account software’,
the value of software investment in Poland was projected to amount to 120% of the software
spending reported by WITSA (2002)9. The data on ‘other office equipment’ is aggregated with
IT hardware under the assumption that the former fits into the definition of ICT.
Based on the above assumption, the real value of investment in ICT in Poland is much lower
than ICT spending reported by WITSA (2002) (see Table 2)
Table 2. Investments in ICT in Poland, 1992-2001 (current prices, USD million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
IT hardware 545.0 569.2 646.4 819.3 980.2 1119.7 1330.8 1428.5 1539.2 1650.8
Software 96 104.4 127.2 138 216 274.8 321.6 370.8 536.4 613.2
Telecom. equipment 155.1 176.1 200.1 323.7 360.3 395.1 1315.2 1609.2 1780.5 1937.4
Total ICT 796.1 849.7 973.7 1281.0 1556.5 1789.6 2967.6 3408.5 3856.1 4201.4
Share of ICT in total
GFCF (in%) 5.5 6.2 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.5 9.2 10.8 12.4 14.2
Source: own estimates based on WITSA (2000, 2002)
Share of ICT investments in total GFCF between 1992-96 has been quite stable at roughly 5.5%
and 6.6%. After 1996, the ICT share has started to quickly increase and reached 12.4% in 2000
and 14.2% in 2001 (Table 2 and Figure 2). In spite of the significant increase, the ICT share in
total GFCF in Poland in 2000 was still substantially lower than in the EU and the US, where it
amounted to 17.1% and 29.6%, respectively (van Ark et al. 2002)10.
                                                
9 The author’s ratio for software of 1.2 is lower than the 2.05 multiplier used by Daveri (2002) in his study on the
EU countries and the US. Van Ark et al. (2002) study based on actual data from EU national statistical offices found
that Daveri’s ratio for software investment is likely to be significantly exaggerated.
10 Van Ark et al. (2002) reports total nonresidential GFCF only, excluding non-residential buildings. Since Poland’s
GFCF includes residential investment, the gap in ICT investment as share of total GFCF between Poland and the EU
is even larger.10
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Source: own estimates based on WITSA (2000, 2002)
ICT price indices
To arrive at ICT investments in the local currency, the data series were converted from US
dollars into local currency by an annual average exchange rate based on EBRD (2002).
Since a dollar today buys much more computing power than in the previous years, the data on
ICT investments in current prices needs to be deflated to arrive at constant-quality prices.
Otherwise, the use of traditional non-hedonic price indices would significantly understate the
significance of investment in ICT as non-hedonic deflators do not take into account the rapid
decrease in quality-adjusted prices of ICT (for example, the quality-adjusted price of a computer
bought for $1,000 in 1995 amounts to $272 in 2001; the use of non-hedonic price deflator would
however value the same computer at $1,068 in 2001 – based on Jorgenson et al. 2002 dataset for
the US).
Since no quality-adjusted deflators are available from national statistics in transition countries,
the paper uses “price index harmonization” methodology developed by Schreyer (2000) and then
used by Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), van Ark et al. (2002) and others11. According to this
methodology, the ratio of the US hedonic deflators 1990-2001 for ICT investment in computers,
software, and communication equipment relative to deflators for non-computers, non-software
and non-communication equipment (all data based on Jorgenson et al. 2002, who relies on the
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis12) was applied to the aggregate investment deflator for
                                                
11 Only US, France, Denmark, Sweden and Canada report quality-adjusted, so-called hedonic prices for ICT
equipment. National statistics offices in postsocialist countries do not report ICT separately, as it most often
lumped together under “high-technology” products and services. Domestic hedonic price indexes have not been
developed yet, either. For discussion of methodology of hedonic pricing, see OECD (2000) and Mulligen (2002).
12 Jorgenson et al. (2002) constant quality price index is based on BEA deflators for the private sector, government
and households. Alternative approach is to use BEA deflators for the private sector only available from BEA11
Poland for the same period to obtain three separate ICT price harmonized deflators for Poland.
This approach is based on an assumption that the ratio of prices of ICT to the overall investment
prices in Poland follows the same ratio of prices for the US, which seems to be a plausible
assumption given high tradability of ICT products and negligible size of the local ICT
production. Hence, the US price level is directly converted into the local currency after being
corrected for the general level of inflation. Although undoubtedly the above approach has a
number of shortcomings, including the fact that it assumes that there are no differences in
composition of ICT investment between Poland and the US and that price indices of ICT
products imported to Poland and those domestically produced in the US behave in the same way,
the “price index harmonization” method seems to be the most appropriate for constructing the
ICT deflators in the face of lack of deflators from the national statistics. The most important
thing here is to reflect to the largest possible extent the true decline in ICT prices.
Table 3 in the Appendix shows harmonized ICT price indices for the US and Poland for the
period of 1990-2001. The price of computers (IT hardware) in Poland in that period declined by
on average 7% annually. Since 1995 the price declines have accelerated to 16.5% annually,
which is likely to be due to the increase in the rate of technological progress in capacity of
semiconductors (shift from a 3-year to a 2-year production cycle). Unlike in the US, because of
relatively high inflation rate in Poland embodied in the total investment deflator, the prices of
software and communication equipment have been rising in the period by 13.1% and 11.0%
annually, respectively. The inflation in both assets after 1995 has however substantially declined
to 6.7% and 3.2% annually, reflecting much slower overall inflation in the total investment price
index and relatively faster decline in quality-adjusted prices.
ICT capital stock
To arrive at a measure of the ICT stock, the real ICT investment series obtained above need to be
depreciated using perpetual inventory method (PIM). In PIM method, capital stock is defined as
a weighted sum of past investments with weights given by the relative efficiencies of capital
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with Ki,T  the capital stock (for a particular asset type i) at time T, ∂i,t the efficiency of a capital
good i of age t relative to the efficiency of a new capital good, and Ii,T-t the investments in period
T-t.14 A geometric depreciation pattern is applied, which – as argued by Fraumeni (1997) - better
reflects the pattern of stock aging (faster at the beginning of the utilization period, slower
towards the end of efficient life) than a straight-line depreciation method. Hence, with a given
constant rate of depreciation ∂i different for each asset type, ∂i,t is given by
1
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(2002). In this paper, Jorgenson et al (ibid.) dataset’s base year 1996 has been changed to 1995 to be consistent
with the data on GDP and fixed capital stock obtained from the national statistical office.
13 This section is largely based on van Ark et al. (2002).
14 As remarked by van Ark et al. (ibid), various equations of that kind make an implicit assumption that services of
assets of various vintages are perfect substitutes for each other.12
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Because of the lack of data on ICT investments before 1992 and in order to arrive at a
sufficiently long series of ICT stock, the investment stock series were extrapolated back to 1985
by applying a geometric average of growth rates in ICT real investment for the three types of
assets in local currency between 1992-2001. ICT stock in 1985 was assumed to equal zero15.
While this is surely an improbable assumption, given high depreciation rates for ICT, most of the
early ICT stock from before 1992 depreciates to less than 10 per cent of the value of ICT stock in
1995 and to almost zero by 2000. Nonetheless, to limit the impact of the assumptions on ICT
investments, the contribution of ICT investment to growth will cover the period starting from
1995 only.
Alternative method of obtaining sufficiently long series of ICT investment, as reported by van
Ark et al. (2002), is to derive the ICT investment for the period 1985-93 from a share of ICT
investment in aggregate investment in a period for which the relevant data exists. Yet, this
approach can be quite misleading since there is no compelling reason to believe that the share of
ICT investment in mid-1990’s was comparable to that in 1985. It is particularly true in transition
economies, which in 1985 were operating under totally different economic system of a
command, communist economy.
Van Ark et al. (ibid.) in their study apply a commodity flow method to arrive at long series of
ICT investment, yet given the lack of detailed data on input-output tables from national statistical
offices, its use in measuring ICT investment in postsocialist countries is not possible.
Geometric depreciation rate for IT hardware is based on van Ark et al. (ibid.) and is set at 0.295.
Depreciation rates for telecommunications equipment and software, obtained from Jorgenson
and Stiroh (2000) and Oulton (2001), were set at 0.115 and 0.315, respectively.
The real investments in ICT in Poland between 1995 and 2000 have been growing at an average
annual rate of 50.9% (Table 4), which was a much faster rate than in the EU and the US.
Investments in communication equipment were particularly robust in comparison to the EU and
the US as they were increasing in the period by 65.7% annually. This is likely to be due to
substantial pent up demand for communication services and fast catching up in communication
infrastructure from low levels of telephone penetration.
Table 4. Growth rates in real ICT investment in Poland and selected countries, arithmetic
average for 1995-2000
Poland EU USA
IT hardware 52.7% 31.6% 27.0%




Total ICT 50.9% 18.5% 19.3%
Source: Van Ark et al. (2002) for the EU and the US, own estimates for Poland
                                                
15 Alternatively, one can assume the value of ICT capital stock to equal zero in 1992. Yet, since some ICT stock
surely existed in 1992, it seems methodologically more appropriate to extrapolate the data back to 1985 as the
starting point of ICT stock accumulation.13
In the end the author arrived at a measure of the end-year real ICT capital stock 1985-2001.
These were adjusted from end-year to mid-year. Between 1995 and 2000 on the back of large
ICT investments the real stock for three types of ICT assets have been quickly growing,
particularly in comparison to other, non-ICT capital (Figure 4)
Figure 4. Average annual growth rates in real mid-year ICT and non-ICT capital stock, 1995-




















Other IT hardware Software Telecom.
Equipment
Source: own estimates
As a consequence of the rapid growth in real ICT stock, its share in gross total capital stock
substantially increased from 0.71% in 1995 to 4.72% in 2000 (Figure 5).
Figure 5: ICT real mid-year capital stock as a percentage of a total gross mid-year capital stock
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Source: own estimates
Accounting for non-ICT capital stock
In order to sustain consistency, the methodology applied to constructing the ICT capital stock
from ICT investments is also applied to construct the non-ICT capital stock for four non-ICT
asset types for the years 1995-2000.16 Data on total investments in total gross fixed capital for all
four categories in both fixed and current prices was available from the Central Statistical Office
(2002)17. Investment deflators for each category of non-ICT assets were constructed on the basis
of data available from the above.
Due to unavailability of long-run GFCF series (consistent GFCF series start only from 1990), the
non-ICT capital stock was calculated based on 1995 constant prices for four non-ICT categories.
Data on investment for years 1995-2000 for all four categories were depreciated using the same
PIM method as for the ICT stock (as in equation 6). Since Central Statistical Office does not
report geometric depreciation rates for investment flows for the above aggregate categories, the
study uses rates based on van Ark et al. (2002) (Table 5).18
Table 5. Depreciation rates for non-ICT capital
Buildings and structures* 0.028
Non-ICT equipment 0.132
Transport equipment 0.191
Other fixed assets** 0.10
** Van Ark et al. (ibid) reports rates for “Non-residential buildings and structures” only, while
available data aggregates residential and non-residential investment. Assumption is then made
that the depreciation rate for both is the same; *As reported by Central Statistical Office: “Long
term plantings, detailed meliorations and livestock (basic herd). Depreciation rate based on own
estimate. The value of other fixed assets does not exceed 2% of the total stock in the period, so
the impact of the estimate is negligible.
Source: Van Ark et al. (2002)
Accounting for ICT income share
Having arrived at the estimates of ICT capital stock, the annual capital service flows from the
stocks have to be estimated in order to measure the contribution of ICT capital to ouput growth.
Capital service flows, representing the user costs for each type of asset, for ICT capital are much
higher than for non-ICT capital due to high rates of depreciation for ICT assets and relatively
large capital loss due to fast decrease in ICT prices. In other words, a dollar spent on new ICT
equipment should provide higher services flows than alternative investment in non-ICT
equipment. The difference between growth in capital services and capital stock represents the
                                                
16 The use of actual data from Poland’s Central Statistical Office, which is based on a straight-line depreciation
pattern, would create inconsistency in methodological approach and result in incomparable results.
17 Investments in “non-ICT equipment” were obtained by deducting current price investments in IT hardware and
telecommunication equipment from data series on investment in “machinery, technical equipment and tools”.
Investments on software were not deducted since they are not part of the national accounts.
18 This is arguably a very rough estimate. Yet, there is no reason why actual depreciation rates in Poland would
have to be substantially different than those reported by van Ark et al. Nonetheless, any changes in depreciation
rates would have a negligible impact on the final results of the study.15
improvement in capital quality, which reflects the substitution towards assets from higher
marginal products. Since ICT capital has relatively high marginal product, then a shift towards
ICT increases the overall quality of capital. Estimates based on capital stock only rather than on
capital services does not take into account this increase in quality of capital and hence
underestimates the contribution of ICT capital to output growth (Jorgenson 2001).
Similarly to van Ark et al. (2002), the author measures the contribution of ICT capital to output
growth on the basis of the services flows from three separate ICT assets (IT hardware, software
and telecommunication equipment) and four non-ICT assets (buildings and structures, non-ICT
equipment, transport equipment, and other non-ICT capital). Estimation of rental prices for each
of the assets provides their weights in total income.
Based on an assumption that the flow of capital services from ICT capital (K
c) and non-ICT
capital (K
n) is proportional to the mid-year capital stock (average of  T i K ,  and 1 , − T i K ), the capital
services for each type of asset will be obtained as
Y p K r CS y T i i i / , =           (7)
where  i r  represents user costs of each specific asset,  T i K , real capital stock of a specific asset at
time T, and  y p the output price. User cost of each specific asset will be denoted as
) ( , , T i i T T i i r p r π − ∂ + =             (8)
where T i p ,  represents the acquisition price of a new asset,  T r represents the nominal rate of return,
∂i the depreciation rate of asset type I, and  T i, π , the rate of inflation in the price of asset type I,
which can be calculated from the appropriate price deflators. The expression in the brackets
represents the rental price, which measures the price of an asset good at which the investor is
indifferent between buying or renting the capital good cost of capital. The rental price represents
the cost of capital, which is an annualisation factor that transforms the acquisition price of
investment goods into the price of capital input.
As shown in equations (2), (7) and (8) the size of the contribution of ICT capital to output
growth will depend on the rate of capital accumulation, gross rate of return, and capital-ouput
ratio.
Depreciation rates for each asset type and rate of inflation in the price of each asset are already
available. The nominal rate of return on the total stock in the economy has to be however
estimated in order to calculate the user costs for each type of asset. The methodology for
obtaining the nominal rate of return was developed by Jorgenson et al. (1987). The methodology
applies an ex-post approach to measure the nominal rate of return based on the following
assumptions:
a)  there is perfect competition and zero profits in each market sector
b)  the nominal rate of return is equal for all assets in a particular market sector
c)  the sum of rental payments for all assets is equal to total capital compensation, that is
share of capital in total income.
Based on the above assumptions and given that the capital revenue (CR)16
∑ =
i
T i T i
T K p CR , ,                        (9)
where pi represents the rental price of capital services from asset type i and that for each asset
type
T i i T T i r p , , π − ∂ + =                                  (10)
where  T r  represents the nominal internal rate of return, ∂i the depreciation rate and  T i, π  the rate
of inflation, the pre-tax nominal rate of return  T r  can be obtained by combining (8) and (9)
∑ ∑ − ∂ + =
i
T i T i i
i
T i T
T K K r CR , , , ) ( π                    (11)
and finally solving for  T r 19
∑
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Poland’s average nominal rate of return for 1995-2000 amounted to 0.246. This compares with
the EU and the US average of 0.14 and 0.15 for that period (van Ark et al. ibid.). In the same
study, out of all the EU countries, Ireland had the highest rate of return at 0.38 followed by
Portugal, the UK, and Italy, at 0.19, 0.18 and 0.17, respectively20. Similar study by Oliner and
Sichel (2000) came up with the estimated rate of return on non-residential equipment and
structures for the US for 1970-92 of 0.12 on average. High nominal rate of return for Poland is
due to large increases in capital revenue relative to capital stock.21
Combining nominal rate of return with a depreciation rate for each asset and the rate of inflation
in the price of asset type yields a total gross rate of return on asset type. Average gross rate of
return for IT hardware, software and telecommunication equipment between 1995-2000
amounted to 69.5%, 48.2%, and 31.1%, respectively.
Having obtained an estimate of the nominal rate of return for 1995-2000 and total user costs for
each type of equipment, the income share of ICT capital in total GDP can be estimated (Table 6).
                                                
19 Due to lack of data on tax expenditure, it was not possible to estimate the after tax rate of return. For a
methodology of after-tax measurement of rate of return, refer to Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). In this study, the
capital revenu CR was estimated as a capital share in total income in current prices.
20 Van Ark et al. (ibid) study is for non-residential capital only, while this study computed the nominal rate of
return for the capital stock including residential stock. Exclusion of the residential capital, if suitable data were
available, would further increase the rate of return for Poland relative to international comparisons.
21 The sensitivity analysis of the pre-tax nominal rate of return shows that the estimates of the contribution of ICT
capital to output growth are quite sensitive to changes in the rate of return: a one tenth of percentage point
change in the rate of return alters the contribution of ICT capital to growth by almost exactly the same one tenth
of a percentage point. As the nominal rate of return in this study seems to be on a high side (also because the rate
is calculated as pre-tax) any other estimates of the rate of return would most likely decrease the impact of ICT
capital on growth.17
Table 6. Average shares of ICT capital, non-ICT capital and labor compensation in GDP in
Poland, EU, and USA, 1995-2000, (in %)
Poland EU USA
IT hardware 0.9 1.0 1.8
Software 0.2 1.0 1.8
Telecom. Equipment 0.4 1.0 1.8
TOTAL ICT 1.50 3.0 5.4
Buildings and structures* 27.1 19.5 15.0
Non-ICT equipment 10.5 8.3 7.8
Transport equipment 4.2 2.8 2.8
Other 0.8 n.a. n.a.
TOTAL non-ICT 42.6 30.8 25.9
Total capital 44.1 33.8 31.3
Total labor 55.9 66.2 68.7
Source: own estimates for Poland, van Ark et al. (ibid) for the UE and the US. * Van Ark et al.
for non-residential buildings only.
Poland’s ICT capital compensation shares are much lower than in the EU and the US. This
particularly applies to software and telecommunication equipment, which reflects still low stock
of both types of ICT assets.
4. The contribution of ICT investment to output growth and labor productivity in Poland
Given availability of estimates of ICT capital stock and income share of ICT capital in the 1995-
2000 period, it is now possible to measure the contribution of ICT investment to GDP growth in
that period. All remaining data is obtained from the Poland’s Central Statistical Office (2002).22
Using the methodology presented in Section 3, the average contribution of ICT capital to
economic growth in Poland between 1995-2000 amounted to 0.47 percentage points or 8.9% of
average output growth of 5.31% in that period. Table 7 presents the detailed results.
Table 7. Contributions of ICT capital to real output growth in Poland 1995-2000 (in percentage
points and in %)
In percentage points In %






Total ICT capital 0.47 8.90
Non-ICT capital 0.66 12.40
Labor (employment) 0.26 4.82
TFP 3.67 69.09
Total output growth 5.31 100.00
                                                
22 Labor force measured as total employment. No data is available on hours worked.18
The above results can be compared with estimates for the contribution of ICT capital to growth
in the OECD countries in the same period obtained by van Ark et al. (2002), the study largely
based on actual data from national statistics, and Daveri (2002), who used the WITSA dataset for
ICT spending, the same as in this study (Table 8).
Table 8. Percentage point contribution of ICT capital to real output growth in the EU countries
and Poland, 1995-2000
Van Ark et al.
2002
Rank Daveri 2002* Rank
USA 0.86 1 1.45 1
Ireland 0.80 2 0.96 3
UK 0.69 3 1.17 2
Netherlands 0.68 4 0.72 6
Denmark 0.61 5 0.65 7
Sweden 0.53 6 0.85 4
Poland 0.47 7 0.47 8
Italy 0.41 8 0.35 13
Finland 0.37 9 0.74 5
Germany 0.37 10 0.45 10
Austria 0.36 11 0.43 12
France 0.35 12 0.44 11
Portugal 0.34 13 0.49 8
Spain 0.27 14 0.34 14
* 1996-99 only.
Source: van Ark et al. (2002), Daveri (2002) and own estimates for Poland
Poland ranks almost exactly in the middle of the sampled countries: 7
th in van Ark’s study and 8
th
in Daveri’s study, ex aequo with Portugal. Poland’s high position relative to its GDP per capita,
which for 2000 hovered around 45% of the EU average, owes to extraordinary rates of growth in
real ICT investment (50% annually between 1995 and 2000) as profit-maximizing firms in
response to rapidly falling prices of ICT have massively substituted investment in ICT capital for
non-ICT capital. The additional incentive for large ICT investments seems to have been the
opportunity to reap extraordinary rates of return on investments in ICT due to substantial pent-up
demand for ICT products and services resulting from low level of penetration of IT and
telecommunications infrastructure, a legacy of underinvestment and technological retardation
under the communist system.
Relative contribution (in per cent) of ICT capital to output growth in Poland between 1995-2000
amounted to 8.9%. It compared with the EU and the US average of 17% and 20%, respectively
(van Ark et al. 2002). The low relative contribution of ICT to GDP in Poland results mostly from
high GDP growth in that period, which averaged 5.31% annually.
Labor productivity growth in Poland in the second part of the 1990’s amounted to a very high
average of 5.07% annually. This fast growth was mostly due to substantial increase in TFP (78%
of total growth), which have reflected structural changes in the economy, accelerated
microeconomic restructuring, changing composition of labor force, and rising quality of human
capital. Capital deepening contributed the remaining 22% of the growth (Table 9).19
ICT capital had a larger impact on growth in labor productivity (12.7%) than its contribution to
economic growth in the period (8.9%). Contribution of ICT capital was also higher than that of
the non-ICT equipment.















1995 6.07 0.63 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.02 0.05 5.40
1996 1.11 -1.45 -0.76 0.31 0.24 0.02 0.05 2.54
1997 7.19 0.94 0.43 0.51 0.38 0.06 0.07 6.22
1998 2.68 0.52 -0.22 0.74 0.44 0.06 0.25 2.13
1999 7.00 3.26 2.20 1.06 0.52 0.07 0.47 3.78
2000 6.37 2.88 1.91 0.97 0.46 0.09 0.42 3.56
Average
1995-2000
5.07 1.13 0.48 0.65 0.38 0.05 0.22 3.94
In % of
LP growth
22.29 9.55 12.74 7.42 1.05 4.27 77.71
Source: own estimates
According to van Ark et al. study, ICT capital was responsible for 34% and 28% of labor
productivity growth in the USA and the EU in the same period, respectively (LP measured per
person hour worked rather than per employed person as in this study). ICT contribution to LP in
Poland was substantially smaller owing to much lower ICT income share in total income.
5  Conclusions
This paper makes a first attempt at estimating a contribution of ICT capital to output growth and
labor productivity in Poland between 1995-2000 based on an extended growth accounting
framework and private-source data on ICT spending from WITSA (2000, 2002). The paper
shows that the contribution of investment in IT hardware, software and telecommunication
equipment represented some 8.9% of an average GDP growth in the period or 0.47 of a
percentage point out of 5.31% average output growth in that period. This result places Poland in
the middle of the ranking of the contribution of ICT capital to growth in the EU countries and the
US, well above Poland’s position based on GDP per capita. ICT capital deepening has also
contributed 0.65 of a percentage point or 12.74% of labor productivity growth in the same
period.
The relatively large contribution of ICT capital to output growth is based on an extraordinary
acceleration in real ICT investments, which were growing between 1995-2000 at an average
cumulative rate of 50.9% a year. Consequently, by 2001 Poland has caught up with other middle
and lower income countries in terms of ICT spending per GDP. Among transition economies,
Poland is fourth in terms of ICT spending as per cent of GDP, but number one in nominal terms
of total spending on ICT.
Large investments in ICT seem to have been induced by falling prices of ICT products and
services, which enticed companies to substitute ICT for non-ICT capital. Polish companies
substantially increased outlays on ICT also in order to satisfy pent-up demand for ICT products20
and services. This pent-up demand for ICT resulted in turn from a need to upgrade poor ICT
infrastructure, which was a legacy of decapitalization and technological gap existing before
1989. Fast economic growth, which accelerated from 3.8% in 1993 to 6.8% in 1997 and more
than 4% in 2000-01, further contributed to an increase in demand for ICT.
One can plausibly assume that given a small size of ICT-producing sector in Poland, which is
roughly estimated to have represented some 1% to 2% of GDP in 2002, its impact on ouput
growth and productivity would not be significant. For the same reason, the contribution of TFP
growth in ICT-producing industry to economy-wide TFP is likely to be marginal. As for the
spillover effects of ICT use and production, it is too early to estimate them, yet given small size
of the ICT producing sector and relatively low penetration of ICT networks, any potential effects
are poised to be negligible. Hence, the overall impact of ICT on output growth seems to be
predominantly dependent on ICT capital, whose contribution to GDP growth is presented in this
paper.
One can speculate that given continuation of growth in ICT investment above the growth rates
for non-ICT capital, as reported by various local data sources, the contribution of ICT capital to
growth is likely to gradually increase. Future research, aside from estimating the ICT capital
impact on growth in the remaining post-communist economies along the lines presented in this
paper, should focus on measuring the contribution of ICT production to output growth and an
economy-wide TFP growth in Poland and other post-communist countries.21
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Appendix
Table 3. Price indices for ICT stock
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Computers US 2.2002 1.9586 1.6411 1.3717 1.2088 1.00 0.7496 0.5655 0.4073 0.3045 0.2584 0.2046
Non-computers US 0.8918 0.9115 0.9288 0.9419 0.9754 1.00 1.0273 1.0479 1.0528 1.0618 1.0822 1.0981
Investment deflator Poland 0.3063 0.4656 0.5537 0.6636 0.8412 1.00 1.1677 1.3169 1.4248 1.5021 1.5661 1.5600
Computers Poland 0.7557 1.0005 0.9785 0.9664 1.0424 1.00 0.8520 0.7107 0.5512 0.4308 0.3740 0.2906
Software US 1.0861 1.0921 1.0287 1.0258 1.0025 1.00 0.9676 0.9338 0.9046 0.9085 0.9209 0.9351
Non-software US 0.8968 0.9158 0.9325 0.9443 0.9772 1.00 1.0246 1.0423 1.0437 1.0486 1.0665 1.0791
Software Poland 0.3709 0.5552 0.6109 0.7209 0.8629 1.00 1.1027 1.1799 1.2350 1.3014 1.3524 1.3518
Communication equipment
US 1.1056 1.0935 1.0799 1.0623 1.0366 1.00 0.9667 0.9437 0.8997 0.8513 0.8067 0.7626
Non-communication US 0.8965 0.9158 0.9320 0.9439 0.9768 1.00 1.0245 1.0419 1.0433 1.0492 1.0682 1.0822
Communication equipment
Poland 0.3777 0.5560 0.6416 0.7469 0.8926 1.00 1.1019 1.1928 1.2286 1.2188 1.1827 1.0993
Note: “IT hardware” represents “Computers” in the paper. Similalrly, “Telecommunication equipment” stands for “Communication Equipment”.